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he time has come when the European Central Bank must act with ‘unconventional’ 
tools to achieve its target of an inflation rate ‘below but close to 2 per cent’, for two 
simple reasons. The first is that the annual rate of (consumer price) inflation became 
negative in December 2014, has been below 1% since October 2013, and is not certain to 
recover soon on its own. The second reason is that all other tools available to the ECB have 
been tried, including the new facility of ultra-cheap refinancing of banks launched last 
September, but have not worked, owing to the fact that the demand for loans by the private 
sector remains flat or is shrinking in many eurozone member states. Inflation expectations in 
the two-to-five-year horizon are falling towards zero in all the main financial markets in the 
eurozone, indicating that financial markets are losing faith in the ability of the ECB to 
achieve its inflation target. 
While the final decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union is not yet available, the 
opinion of Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalόn has also strengthened the legal position of 
the ECB: he has maintained that the ECB must have broad discretion when framing and 
implementing the EU’s monetary policy and, more specifically, that bond purchases (under 
the OMT programme), although an unconventional instrument entailing some risks, 
nevertheless fall within the ECB’s mandate. 
The only option left to the ECB to regain its credibility with financial markets and the public 
at large is to launch a ‘quantitative easing’ (QE) programme entailing large purchases in the 
open market of long-term securities, and thus bring down aggressively nominal interest rates 
on long maturities.  
Some economists and market analysts are sceptical that the interventions would succeed in 
raising the inflation rate and economic activity: their arguments are unconvincing. They do 
not seem to see the special conditions created by the ‘balance-sheet recession’ that we are 
living through, with its long-lasting impact on private savings (dramatically up), private 
demand (dramatically down) and core inflation – with a dimension specific to the eurozone 
added by market fragmentation. Under these circumstances, the effects of expansionary 
monetary (and fiscal) policy need more time to materialise and may not be fully visible for 
quite some time.  
An aggressive programme of quantitative easing will lower the exchange rate of the euro – 
which has already been pushed down by the expectation of QE. The unreasonably high 
exchange rate of the euro since the inception of the financial crisis has been a main factor 
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depressing inflation (as often acknowledged by ECB President Mario Draghi) and demand, 
through net exports, in the Eurozone. Its impact has been especially detrimental to 
employment in low-labour productivity southern eurozone countries. In practice, for the 
past seven years the euro has been the residual currency in the international monetary 
system, taking the brunt of aggressive monetary expansion in the US and the UK and 
importing deflation from the rest of the world.  
The lower exchange rate will raise the price of imported goods and spur exports, stimulating 
manufacturing activity; sooner or later this will translate into higher employment and wages, 
after years of depressed demand for labour. Investment demand will be encouraged by 
ultra-low long-term interest rates, starting with private housing, as is already happening in 
southern eurozone countries. Moreover, and most importantly, as long-term interest rates 
fall below the nominal rate of increase of GDP, the process of deleveraging – the reduction of 
excessive debts accumulated in the past by the private sector – will accelerate and make it 
possible for them to reduce savings and increase spending. This is the most positive and less 
questioned result from the US experience with QE. Market fragmentation will also recede, as 
interest rates converge in the main markets, thus fully restoring the transmission channels of 
monetary policy. This feature, unique to the eurozone, should strengthen the effectiveness of 
QE. 
Of course, there is one country that may benefit less from QE than the others, and this is 
Germany, where ultra-low low interest rates already depress the returns to financial 
investment and hence private demand, partially offsetting the positive impact stemming 
from net exports and a stronger recovery in the other eurozone economies. The paradox in 
the present situation, however, is that without QE Germany might suffer even more, as 
capital continues to flow mainly or exclusively into German markets in search of safe 
investments, while shunning riskier securities in highly indebted eurozone partners. In this 
regard, QE should help, rather than damage, by creating greater confidence that the 
eurozone will not run into serious trouble again and thus slow the flow of capital into 
Germany. 
To be credible, the QE programme must entail large purchases of securities over a protracted 
period of time; given the relatively small size of private securities markets, it will inevitably 
comprise large purchases of sovereign debts. There are two options for determining the size 
and duration of QE purchases: the first is to announce a constant monthly rate of purchase as 
long as inflation doesn’t revert to some positive number well above 1% (perhaps, not fully 
2%, in order to avoid overshooting the target); the second is to announce that purchases will 
continue until the ECB balance sheet has reached the €2 trillion (thousand billion) target 
already decided by its governing council. Any other approach, such as capping the 
programme at some arbitrary number, say €500 billion, as advocated by some, would 
undermine the credibility of the ECB action from the start while still exposing it to the same 
risks. 
If these purchases are spread out evenly across all the main markets – perhaps according to 
some predetermined key, such as countries’ share in eurozone GDP or ECB capital – the ECB 
will avoid any accusation of acting to facilitate the deficit financing of some member states 
relative to others. For the same purpose, as has been suggested by the CJEU Advocate 
General, the open market purchases of sovereigns must be implemented in such a way “that 
a market price can form in respect of the government bonds concerned so that there 
continues to be a real difference between a purchase of bonds on the primary market and 
purchase in the secondary market”.  
However, it is also important to understand that all purchases of securities by the ECB will 
reduce interest-rate spreads between the main markets, even if the ECB only bought German 
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Bunds: this happens because banks and private investors will then inevitably allocate their 
extra liquidity to purchase the (riskier) securities yielding higher returns. Thus, after starting 
QE, falling interest-rate spreads would not indicate that the ECB is favouring some member 
states over others with its operations, thus trespassing the border between monetary policy 
and economic policy (which is off limits for the ECB). 
A critical aspect here is how to avoid that the ECB interventions generate moral hazard by 
weakening budgetary discipline or economic reform efforts in highly indebted countries, as 
interest rates on their sovereigns fall. On this, it must be recalled that the ECB will have full 
discretion to exclude some sovereign paper from its purchases, and publicly announce those 
exclusions, should the issuing member state (say, a new Greek government after the 
forthcoming elections) signal the intention to renege on its reform commitments. Financial 
markets would then immediately and severely punish the offender. 
The last hurdle for the ECB to resolve before launching QE concerns the sharing of risks 
stemming from its purchases of sovereigns. To be sure, this must be the risk of a sovereign 
default or debt restructuring, rather than more broadly the risk of capital losses on the 
securities portfolio stemming from market gyrations, which will inevitably stay with the 
ECB. In any event, the ECB can initially be expected to make large gains on the value of its 
securities, as interest rates fall: these gains will constitute a sizeable buffer against potential 
losses on individual sovereigns. 
The question raised here, however, is not one of shielding the ECB from market risks on its 
operations, but rather that of avoiding any transfer of resources of a fiscal nature between the 
member states of the eurozone through the ECB’s balance sheet – which has become the 
constant obsession of those who believe that monetary union must exclude any risk sharing 
or risk transfer between its participants. On this, a member of the ECB Executive Board has 
hinted that some burden for these losses may have to fall on national central banks. This 
seems feasible without undermining the unitary nature of ECB market interventions: one 
may imagine schemes to transfer first losses up to a given percentage to national central 
banks, which would absorb them within their plentiful capital. 
What makes me shiver in horror, on the other hand, is the idea of entrusting each national 
central bank with the task of buying its own sovereigns: this would not only throw the ECB 
open market purchases “in the same murky waters as its emergency liquidity assistance” 
(Claire Jones, FT, 14 January 2015), but could be taken as the anticipation of a possible 
unravelling of monetary union, should serious stress re-emerge on eurozone sovereigns. 
Indeed, as Daniel Gros and Christian Kopf convincingly argue in a forthcoming commentary 
(“There’s no QE without risk-sharing”), such an approach might create a ‘diabolical’ loop 
between national central banks and their own governments, that not only would negate the 
separation between monetary policy and national fiscal policies mandated by the EU Treaty, 
but could truly break monetary union under renewed financial shocks such as those 
experienced in 2011-12. 
